Administrators, corporatism etc.
"On reading," by Simon Wain-Hobson, is a weekly discussion of scientific papers and news articles around gain of function research in virology.
Since January 2024, Dr. Wain-Hobson has written weekly essays for Biosafety Now discussing risky research in virology. You can read his entire series here.
On wondering about the last ten essays.
One of the common traits among most of the last ten essays, indeed among many preceding them, is how few scientists and organizations care publicly about the biosafety and biosecurity ramifications of their work. Sure, they work within national guidelines in terms of biosafety lab levels. Most feel their responsibility ends with getting science into print. There is no bigger picture.
Since 2005, the InterAcademy Panel statement on biosecurity says Scientists have an obligation to do no harm. They should always take into consideration the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their own activities. They should therefore:
• always bear in mind the potential consequences – possibly harmful – of their research and recognize that individual good conscience does not justify ignoring the possible misuse of their scientific endeavour.’
• refuse to undertake research that has only harmful consequences for humankind. (Do no harm 1).
As the Fouchier and Kawaoka experiments, GOF 2.0 virology, had no societal benefits, just risks (Virus research of concern), their work violates the InterAcademy Panel guidelines that were signed by the US National Academy of Sciences. We know they knew about the work, yet it seems this august academy didn’t care.
We saw in the Ethics of GOF virology that the benefits and risks were unequally divided. The few and trivial benefits were for a very small number of scientists – not more than 100, perhaps 200 at most worldwide - while the potentially massive risks were for 8 billion people including themselves.
Furthermore, the work was tainted by the experimenter meaning that there is no way of knowing what nature would come up with (Observer bias). Nevertheless, the 8 billion were ‘assured’ by a handful on the inside that they followed the science, even though they flip-flopped as they pleased (Following the science).
The reputation of scientists and the aura of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) were such that journalists (Some housekeeping) and academics alike (Off target) played along unquestioningly. Indeed, over GOF 2.0, virologists played along obediently. There was a de facto Pax NIH. And this spread across the world as every non-US virologist had a collaborator or friend financed by the NIH.
Resistance to oversight in the infectious disease space is not new. In fact, the list is long. Going backwards, we’ve seen it concerning the origins of the COVID virus, the US COVID policy, GOF 2.0 research, the resurrection of the eradicated Spanish flu virus which would ‘help with making vaccines,’ and mad cow disease in the UK. We saw the difficulties the NIH encountered investigating Dr. Gallo in the 1990s.
The American Society of Microbiology (ASM) has been a surprising bastion of resistance for over a decade (Crossing the Line, Electroplated nickel silver) Yet taking a longer 50 year view, little has changed (Spineless. Again)
• The scientists don’t want to surrender anything which is odd. Yet they would always retain huge influence anyway for nobody can replace them. It’s a little like doctors - years of training are necessary to achieve their levels of technical competence. Only an interventional cardiologist can replace an interventional cardiologist. Scientists confuse external oversight with loss of control.
• The other strange aspect is that they don’t even want to take part in any discussions despite reaping billions of taxpayer’s dollars plus support from philanthropic foundations.
As we saw, things are far from settled. The 2024 USG policy document on Dual Use Research of Concern is sorely lacking while work on what are probably novel respiratory transmissible bat coronaviruses are being performed in lower than necessary biosafety level labs because recommendations have not been updated (Coronavirus biosafety levels)
So it comes as no surprise that the US legislator is moving in (Risky Research Review Bill) which, typically, upset the ASM (Crossing the line). Furthermore, on February 26, 2025 a new bill, S. 738, was introduced into the US Senate To provide a moratorium on all Federal research grants provided to any institution of higher education or other research institute that is conducting dangerous gain-of-function research. The wording is concise, the definition of gain of function research to be prohibited is clearly GOF 2.0. If passed it would prohibit research on that one ‘really tiny part’ of virology that needs looking at. Amen.
Yet the problem is not just GOF 2.0 research. When the curtain was raised on the UK Government’s handling of COVID everybody could see the awful mess. Scientists, advisors, public health planners had not planned for this type of pandemic This is not surprising as we have seen predicting the next pandemic is impossible. That said, why were other options not considered?
But it was far worse. Those with responsibility didn’t appear to care - Across the UK, systems had grown to be overly bureaucratic. Instead of focusing on skills, technology and infrastructure, they were focused on creating groups, sub-groups and documents. Perhaps go back and reread the essay UK COVID response report for a brutal reminder.
Nobody has apologized, advisors have kept quiet, have not lost face publicly even though they failed their nations badly - today’s bleak new world.
Why do scientists and science administrators not have time to care, for this is what it comes to? The reasons are multiple but not overly complex.
• Administrators. They makes sure their problems are foremost, whether you were initially a goldsmith, scientist, institutional or government official. Accordingly, it is not surprising that administrations are bloated with respect to those they oversee. This is true the world over notably in France. Perhaps the surprise for some readers is that this happens in the life sciences, medicine and public health where the protection of billions of people is the be all and end all, whether the issue at stake is GOF 2.0 viruses, the quality of drinking water or neonatal fatality rates.
Add to this inherent corporatism – you don’t bite the hand that feeds you - and omerta is reasonably assured.
• Authority. Over GOF 2.0, Pax NIH that froze everything before debate had barely started which is most unusual (Chilled virology). It was authoritarian for they didn’t follow the science (Following the science). Administrators are enablers and purse keepers. Unfortunately, the latter are used to having their way. This has to be altered, or else taxpayer’s money will be inefficiently spent.
• Speaking out. Scientists must be allowed to talk freely unless their work is classified. Yes, government employees formally have politicians and administrators over them. There are no problems normally, but precisely on sensitive issues this becomes sensitive. Scientists have to say things as they perceive them. Neither politicians nor administrators should be making calls on what the facts are, the trending hypotheses and the like. That’s for the bench scientists or else there will be problems. Being surrounded by yes men and women is a recipe for disaster.
After having commentated on GOF 2.0 virology since 2012 On reading always had the quiet backing from the top of the Pasteur Institute. One Director even co-sponsored the 2012 meeting on this work at the Royal Society in London. Yet in September 2024 he was told to ‘be careful’ about speaking out on GOF 2.0 even though retired! Analysis of the timeline suggested this admonition was linked to the essay New USG DURC policy - national security and ethics.
• Competition/time. One of the problems today is the breakneck speed of research in the life sciences triggered by the gene cloning revolution aided and abetted by other technological advances. Scientists will tell you they are working flat out. This leaves no spare time to stand and stare, no time to think about the broader dimensions of their work. Certainly not ethics or calls from the InterAcademy Panel – what’s that? - on biosecurity (First, do no harm 2).
Importantly, thinking takes time.
• Age/status. Scientists are most creative when they are young. Beyond 40 it’s harder and creativity is maintained by armies of younger PhD students and post-doctorands, or post-docs as they are called, who obtained their theses say 1-6 year prior. Today, the average age at which a scientist receives his or her first full grant has moved up by close to a decade. Quite a number of silverbacks are still in their labs at well over 70.
The post-45 crowd find themselves on committees in positions where they get to decide. And while they have great experience, by and large the older you are the harder it is to appreciate novelty and even perceive it.
This leads some to become somewhat authoritarian, which was covered somewhat in the essay Two plus two. And today this is nowhere more obvious among those who control the funds or learned societies at the top of the pyramid (Crossing the line, Electroplated Nickel Silver).
Some may say that much of the above can be resumed by the word hubris. It’s a good word but is dismissive and lacks precision. It doesn’t help problem solving for nobody else can replace an interventional cardiologist.
Finally trust.
• Non-scientists just don’t get GOF 2.0 virology and with reason. This has led to public mistrust of virologists.
• Equally, if a scientist cannot trust the work and claims of their colleagues, then their common endeavor collapses into science fiction. An utter waste of taxpayer’s money.
• If papers are untrustworthy, then science can’t make discoveries. New products will be blocked, national economies will be stymied. To be blunt, you can’t make new vaccines or anti-cancer therapies out of opinions or beliefs.
• If problems are not handled in a scientific manner and openly, then the system will collapse.
Science is not just another human endeavor. It has huge impact on society. Along with technology and data driven medicine it has transformed the world, to the point that humans are impacting the physical and ecological dynamics of the globe. And within all this is a “really tiny part” of virology, generating novel human infectious agents with humongous consequences far greater than nuclear weapons.
Change can come from the top, but even a twinge of humbleness is not a frequent trait in the stratosphere of administrations where courage is squeezed out. They are ever willing to talk up a new discovery, perhaps stretch it a bit too far, all short term stuff. They are loath to talk about the down sides of some parts of science.
Fortunately, science is bottom up and as we saw recently a group of scientists asked for an open discussion of dangers of Mirror Life research. This is how it should be. Opinions from on high, like the NIH opinion on GOF 2.0 virus research, block everything. It censured virologists across the world.
We have seen how difficult ‘pandemic preparation’ is, if only because nobody can predict the next pandemic agent. Following the science is easy to say yet is very hard to practice for there are many options.
There are no miracles. Being open to difficulties inherent in practicing science, adapting to new findings rapidly and not being dogmatic will probably be key to some form of relative success. More openness, discussion and accountability and we’d already be along the way to rectifying the errors that showed up during the COVID pandemic.
Conclusion
What are those in the top jobs afraid of? It’s an area where the public want responsibility and measles vaccination, a win-win for those with a modicum of vision. We don’t need spin doctors. We want the real Dr. McCoy.
Aside 1
Thinking takes time. Perhaps take a look at the essay Two plus two. The reflexive 2+2=4 relies on experience and can surface immediately upon hearing some incorrect or poorly formulated phrase uttered in a seminar. However, it’s 2+2=22, the science that moves things on, that needs time.
Aside 2
Please indulge On reading for repeating here the sentence, ‘you can’t make new vaccines or anti-cancer therapies out of opinions or beliefs.’ It’s important.
Aside 3
The 18th century glass stem was made in one go by simultaneously drawing and twisting a hot cylinder of glass with opaque white threads prearranged in a mold. The cylinder could be easily 10 cm in diameter weighing a few kilograms. It would be drawn into a long cable of over 10 meters and once cooled, cut up into stems of 8-10 cm. The white comes from the addition of antimony salts to clear glass. Curiously, only right-handed twists were made, just like DNA. A few left-handed twists are known but they were either made in the Low Countries or in the 19th century and later. Nobody knows why this is so for there is no technical reason to explain it.
Wonderful articles.
“We are one experiment away from devastation”. This summation is alien if you will, because it is ‘too big’. If instead it were true that “we are one experiment away from the devastation of cats and dogs” that might be an easily adopted, common concern. There’s an insanity of not being able to accept that there is something so terrible which needs attention.