Crossing the line
"On reading," by Simon Wain-Hobson, is a weekly discussion of scientific papers and news articles around gain of function research in virology.
Since January 2024, Dr. Wain-Hobson has written weekly essays for Biosafety Now discussing risky research in virology. You can read his entire series here.
On reading ASM and partners raise concerns on research 'blanket ban'. December 6, 2024
This is a short plea to the chairs and vice-chairs of the US Senate and House appropriations committees asking them to remove four words from the final Fiscal Year 2025 appropriations bills. The words? Gain-of-function research. Who’s pleading? A group of 15 learned societies, universities and other groups. That said, the American Society of Microbiology (ASM), the only learned society that has openly championed support for GOF research on microorganisms leading to novel human viruses, was probably the driving force.
The work that started the controversy ended up making the H5N1 bird flu virus transmissible between ferrets by aerosols. Ferret to ferret aerosol transmission of a flu virus is by and large synonymous with transmission between humans. This was dual use research of concern by any other name (Virus research of concern). With its ambiguity (dual use) and anxiety (research of concern) this work was quickly rebranded gain of function research which had a positive spin.
The problem is that words or terms that had prior meanings become ambiguous. An example? If someone said they were seropositive everyone would know they had HIV. Nobody would say, which virus? It was HIV, period. Before, seropositive meant you had antibodies to, say measles which meant you had overcome a natural infection or had been vaccinated. ‘Old’ seropositive was good news; ‘new’ seropositive anything but.
The problem with GOF is that it was a term used in genetics for many years and refers to the acquisition of a new trait or function. It is not automatically synonymous to enhanced danger. Through rebranding and its association with manmade novel human viruses GOF has taken on a new life which we’ll call GOF 2.0. Non-scientists do not know of GOF’s earlier life, aka GOF 1.0.
So when the ASM read Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds made available by this Act may be made available to support directly or indirectly… gain-of-function research in the forthcoming appropriation bills (H.R.8771 and H.R.9029) they finally woke up to the dangers of the rebranded GOF 2.0 boomerang clobbering GOF 1.0.
Gain of function techniques are essential in life sciences research… Additionally, because the proposed bill language refers to “gain of function” research, which is a non-technical term that captures a broad swath of research, much of which does not have security implications, we are concerned that implementing the prohibition will have inadvertent consequences that go far beyond or fall short of Congress’ intention. Very clear and agree 100%. So why did the ASM exploit GOF 1.0 in so many publications to allow the Fouchier and Kawaoka work, GOF 2.0, to slip in? (Deconstructing the portrait). Why, as scientists of professorial rank, did you not purge ambiguity and be clear, which is, by the way, what you’re paid to do?
While we understand that there may be concerns with inappropriate applications of research deemed “gain of function,” with adequate guidance, oversight and safety standards in place, we can prevent those types of projects from going forward without hampering valuable research that would protect and enhance our nation’s health security and the United States’ ability to remain a leader on the global stage. Emphasis added.
• inappropriate applications of research deemed “gain of function,” Please develop.
• we can prevent those types of projects from going forward. Then do so. The ASM could have done this more than a decade ago. Why now? Because they want to claw back control of what they have mishandled.
The latest bizarre chapter from the ASM playbook entitled ‘Facing down Pasteur and Koch’ are multiple references to the military. Without the ability to conduct gain of function research, we run the risk that our military would not have access to vital research needed to address strategic biological warfare vulnerabilities, assess troop readiness and complete threat assessments needed to protect against future adversarial action. This can only refer to classic GOF 1.0
Combating current and future adversarial biological and pathogenic warfare will require research and experiments using gain of function techniques to understand how to address new threats and improve countermeasures. This is GOF 2.0, although the sentence is dense and not too intelligible to this nuts-and-bolts virologist.
Not being well versed in biological weapons control, On reading reached out to some specialists who are. Malcolm Dando, Emeritus Professor, University of Bradford, UK, noted that the latter sentence sounds to me, if not actually crossing the line, then dangerously close to red teaming and imagining new potential threats to address. That is just what we hope that biodefence would carefully avoid but where we know biodefence has been in the past.
Another very knowledgeable biological weapons specialist, retired Dr. Seth Carus who worked at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University at Washington DC, addressed the ambiguity. If GOF 1.0 is being blocked, then I do believe that it would have a significant impact on biodefense research. In fact, it would have a crippling effect on biological research.
If GOF 2.0 the answer is different. That research would involve creating a highly transmissible, highly virulent pathogen. I am skeptical that such research is critical, or even necessary, to biodefense, although I am open to the possibility that there might be instances where such research has utility. Hence, I suspect the biodefense enterprise would go along fine without GOF research of concern.
In a short article from 2004 by Milton Leitenberg and colleagues entitled Biodefence crossing the line you’ll find bullet points describing work to be done at the US National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, among which are genetic engineering, host-range studies and aerosol animal-model development. The Fouchier and Kawaoka experiments envelope all three. As mentioned before, their work generated agents indistinguishable from biological weapons.
The ASM’s claims about protecting the boys and national security must be challenged. On reading supports GOF 1.0 with the plea the that scientists act as canaries in the coal mine – be aware that a line could be crossed unexpectedly or unintentionally and that they must share their concerns whenever this happens. The call for a ban on Mirror Life research is a good example where scientists behaved responsibly.
By contrast GOF 2.0, basically GOF 1.0 on microorganisms that leads to novel human pathogens, should be banned for the purported benefits are tenuous – to be mild - compared to the risk of setting off a pandemic. Particularly as the ASM member and GOF 2.0 supporter Mike Imperiale has said several times, this represents one “really tiny part” of research on infectious diseases. Banning this tiny fraction will not hamstring infectious disease research.
Finally, the ASM stands ready to work with you and your colleagues to ensure that we have a robust research oversight process for gain of function research without a loss to U.S. scientific leadership, military readiness and public health. Sorry, but after 13 years of unremitting opposition to any form of oversight the ASM and others have surrendered their chance of self-governance.
The heavy hand of the legislator that some perceived several years ago is now in action. On reading urges for a ban on GOF 2.0 research on microorganisms, but not GOF 1.0 in the life sciences. That would be shooting US research in the foot, resulting in a needless wound.
Let’s step aside for a moment from the boomerang and take a historical view. From Louis Pasteur onwards, scientists have been beating the hell out of microbes. The viruses for smallpox and rinderpest are no more while poliovirus is down but not out. These resounding successes due to vaccination have been offset in the 21st century by the creation of novel human adapted H5N1, H7N9 and H7N1 flu viruses, mostly made in the USA. The aerosol transmissible of H7N1 virus is particularly lethal – 60% of ferrets were killed.
Members and ASM journal editors have been prolific advocates of GOF 2.0 since the controversy erupted in late 2011. They defended publication of the H7N1 virus work in 2014, (when faced by criticism). With the COVID-19 pandemic they went into overdrive fighting the slightest wisp of support for any discussion of a lab leak only to find themselves in disagreement with the WHO Director. Numerous essays here have exposed the hollowness of ASM publications on GOF research and COVID origins (Deconstructing the portrait, Going places, Flights from reason, Perilous posturing) while more ASM articles have gone uncommented for there is no point boring readers.
Their numbing nadir was calling for censorship of COVID-19 lab leak comment for fear that it would cost lives (Censoring virology). Yet in this very article they write We cannot currently disprove the lab leak hypothesis, aka the jury is out. As if this contradiction wasn’t enough, it is stunning that the advocates of the natural zoonosis hypothesis - virologists, ASM members and others – have not done a better job in proving it. The ASM is an establishment organization that has been looked up to for years, not some extremist online pressure group.
In their current folly they have roped in a whole swath of other organizations and universities and made claims GOF 2.0 will help the military, when it won’t.
In so doing the ASM has crossed a line nobody could have imagined before the GOF 2.0 controversy. They now find themselves on the wrong side of Pasteur, Koch, Roux, Yersin, Calmette, Ross, Flemming, Theiler, Enders, Salk, Sabin and so many more, known and less known, who devoted their lives to beating the hell out of microbes; On the opposite side to a myriad of past and present infectious disease doctors, nurses and public health workers; Out of step with philanthropic organizations who have donated scores of billions of dollars towards beating the hell out of microbes.
It's unusual to strive to be on the wrong side of history. The question is why? The guild mentality suggests working to preserve past privileges and influence. Of course, this is just another version of private gains versus public risks (Ethics of GOF virology).
Conclusion
They don’t have the interests of society at heart and should be ignored.
