Two Plus Two
"On reading," by Simon Wain-Hobson, is a weekly discussion of scientific papers and news articles around gain of function research in virology.
Since January 2024, Dr. Wain-Hobson has written weekly essays for Biosafety Now discussing risky research in virology. You can read his entire series here.
On wondering about the last thirty essays.
There are three ways to do science. The first is the rational approach that respects facts and laws. Let’s call it 2+2=4. Then there are those crazy moments when you have an idea, you see into the future yet know not how you got there. Some come in the shower, others mowing the lawn. The only common denominator is you’re alone, calm, away from text messages, emails and smartphones. Let’s call it 2+2=22.
The third is Orwellian typified by 2+2=5. The example often given is the Soviet agronomist Trofim Lysenko who rejected Mendelian genetics.
There is a variant of 2+2=5 where scientists push their theories beyond the best before date. For example, bosses who cannot back down once their pet hypothesis have been debunked or superseded by a better one.
Most of what is done in research is incremental made by climbing on the shoulders of giants as the expression goes. Basically 2+2=4. When the startling springs forth, 2+2=22, it is frequently not understood. ‘Howard, of course RNA can’t be copied back to DNA’. Howard Temin’s postulate proved right and he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1975 for this discovery along with David Baltimore.
Ditto Stanley Prusiner and his infectious prion protein theory which was crowned by the 1997 Nobel Prize in Medicine. The outrageous can become mainstream. It’s been said before by Arthur Koestler and his paradigm shifts, but novelty is frequently not understood. It takes time. This is captured by Rolf Zinkernagel’s (1996 Nobel for Medicine) neat formula for getting a scientific paper published:
Old data, old method, no way.
Old data, new method, OK.
New data, old method, OK.
New data, new method, no way.
Conclusion: scientists are conservative while incremental change is the norm. They are not always good with novelty.
With the intense competition today, nobody admits an error, far less makes an apology, even though making errors is part and parcel of science. There is too much at stake in terms of grant money and reputation. Occasionally the narrative changes under criticism but only a little. This is compounded by many using social media to enhance their reach, their influence. Sadly, it comes with language that would not make it to print in a scientific paper. Not even in an editorial or opinion where language is changing fast (Sense not Sagas, Gaslighting).
Viewed from outside, scientists and medics are highly appreciated, and it is fair to say rightly so. Society supports them to help solve a vast raft of immediate and long-term health problems as well as underpinning national economies. With their PhDs, MDs, professorships and wot nots they are considered rational, oops a little more rational than the rest. And even though the editor of Science, Holden Thorp, mentions human foibles (Would Healing) how come foibles trump training?
Yet Thorpe must be right although foibles is an euphemism. Why has it been so hard to discuss so-called Gain of Function (GOF) avian flu research without passion? And since nobody has put forth a good rationale in over 12 years, why is this example of 2+2=5 going unchecked?
Answer? The guild mentality is dominant even when lives and national security are at stake (New USG DURC policy, Lab acquired infections). Big Science brooks no criticism. This chill comes from the top and makes it unsafe for a conscientious objector, cum whistleblower, cum someone who thinks differently to speak out (Chilled virology, Sound of silence). And all this under the illusion of control (Pandemic illusions), not to mention the supporting roles of self-appointed arbiters who get virology wrong (Specialist opinion, What we should worry about, Cancel virology), science journal editors (Gaslighting) and main stream media journalists (Chilly New York times).
The reality is that bird flu viruses have been dropping from the skies since they adapted to the avian gut (Skyfall) eons ago and virologists get infected by the beasts they study – accidents which are sometimes brushed under the carpet to various degrees by administrators in universities and institutions (Lab acquired infections).
We’ve been over the fact that science is very tough - you’re always up against the unknown, up against yourself, even at the end of your career when you have so much experience. Scientists are limited by their own creativity which generally, but not always, fades with age. If viral outbreaks and epidemics are hard to handle, pandemics are the hardest. The animal reservoir is replete with candidates. Prediction is intrinsically hard for a whole host of reasons.
During and post-COVID we’ve heard from umpteen ‘pandemic experts’, even though there have been relatively few big pandemics in the period following Pasteur and his germ theory. A pandemic expert just means that they know about past pandemics. It doesn’t mean they are expert in handling an unfolding pandemic by an unknown virus. Indeed, how could that be? This is not to disparage those with immense knowledge, rather to urge for a little humility, transparency and admit that we shouldn’t maintain illusions of control (Pandemic illusions). That may not go down well with a health secretary or minister who will always, repeat always, be looking for ‘can do’ promising subordinates; but it might avoid some errors made in the past. After all, first, do no harm (Do no harm 1, 2).
An upcoming essay will discuss the first report from the UK Governments independent enquiry into the COVID-19 pandemic. Two short excerpts suffice here:
In 2019, it was widely believed, in the UK and abroad, that the UK was not only properly prepared but was one of the best-prepared countries in the world to respond to a pandemic. This Report concludes that, in reality, the UK was ill prepared for dealing with a catastrophic emergency, let alone the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic that actually struck.
Across the UK, systems had grown to be overly bureaucratic. Instead of focusing on skills, technology and infrastructure, they were focused on creating groups, sub-groups and documents.
There is much to be learnt from handling the COVID pandemic. Checks and controls can be built into Big Science but in the case of GOF virology it was decided upon high, nonetheless (Chilled virology). Nobody dared rock the boat (Pandemic illusions) even though the work was the equivalent of biological warfare performed in plain sight by highly trained civilian scientists, courtesy of the taxpayer. The new USG regulations (New USG DURC policy) leave a great deal to be desired in that there is still no independent oversight of this work.
There are enough problems on the planet fighting viruses not to mention frizzling the globe. We’ve only eradicated four viruses, smallpox and rinderpest and poliovirus 2 and 3. But not yet poliovirus 1.
And in tackling problems we don’t need distractions for the whole DURC (ex-GOF) saga has been a big one from fighting infectious diseases. Let’s look at a very different, but topical distraction. Have you seen photos of the surface of Mars? Depressing. Rocks & dust. Barren in the extreme although the recent touch of raw sulfur was curious. It’s also irradiated and cold. Unlike the sheen of blue-veined marble seen in Earthrise. Why pretend to settle there?
Billionaire Jared Issaacman who went into space this September on the Polaris Dawn mission said, "Back at home we all have a lot of work to do, but from here Earth sure looks like a perfect world". Thanks for that. Please repeat it endlessly.
The NIH has been spending taxpayers’ money pushing GOF flu research against reason. Critics have been sidelined.
We must keep virology in the bounds of 2+2=4 and absorb the 2+2=22 flashes when they occur. Only a few virologists need to dial down the language. The majority continue to do a great job. Virology is too important a subject to become so polarized. We’re all in it together.
And if the press asks questions, be honest and remind them it takes time for science to accomplish its wonders. Perhaps stop social media as it’s your scientific papers, and what colleagues think of them, that count. That’s not a big ask.
2+2≠5. Never did.
Aside 1
French Nobel François Jacob wrote about day science and night science. 2+2=4 and 2+2=22 are their equivalents. He knew there was a little voice in your mind trying to speak with you. The problem was always the ambient noise drowning it out. Another signal to noise problem.
Aside 2
The end of the year is approaching and we’re on the third On wondering. It’s a play on the New England Christmas carol ‘I wonder as I wander’, itself a wonderful description of doing science.
Aside 3
It is assumed that the reader knows something of the GOF controversy in virology. To ensure the essays remain short, they are best read as a series. Are the essays too dense or difficult to absorb? Comments please. Suggestions for an article around which a future essay could be crafted would be welcome.
Aside 4
The essay Lab Acquired Infections was perhaps an oddball. It showed up on the radar of consciousness in the last millennium after helping a group of Parisian nurses who had acquired HIV from needlesticks during their work with AIDS patients. As it was a new disease, authorities hadn’t yet added HIV to the list of professional hazards. And if something is not on the list…
The group was denied discussing their plight on three Parisian hospital campuses, despite one nurse having got HBV, HCV and HIV from a single needlestick.
In the end the group met in the historic amphitheater at the Pasteur Institute. They spoke softly although angst was palpable. These were the dark years, before the arrival of triple therapy.
Having worked on HIV, On reading invited a journalist from the biggest French TV network. At the end of the meeting, she asked if one of the nurses would speak on camera. Marie volunteered. It went out on prime-time evening news. The following day Luc Montagnier obtained a meeting with the Health Minister, Simone Weil who was deported to Auschwitz at the age of 16. This has always marked her out among politicians. After a one-on-one meeting with Marie, not her real name, HIV infection was quickly recognized as a professional illness for health care workers.
Finally on the list.
A tiny detail. For a number of years, Simone Weil had her chauffeur deliver a bouquet of flowers to Marie on her birthday. Some simply can.
The Bioinformatics and Institutional limits of the questions you ask are important…but the mistakes are often not only in Virology, which result in LAI, but also in the data science linked to the Error Detection Paths and Patterns.
Dear NLM Officer,
Re: SARS-CoV-2 reference sequence suppression and other COVID Origin research GenBank data omissions
I am writing to learn more about how it is that the SARS-CoV-2 reference sequence became suppressed in May 2023?
<<May 6, 2023 02:21 PM; suppressed; This record was removed by RefSeq staff. Please contact info@ncbi.nlm.nih.gov for further details.>>
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore/NC_045512.2?report=girevhist
Also, I would like to know more about the sequence that was deleted WH01 from Lili Ren, discussed in the article below.
https://www.science.org/content/article/first-sars-cov-2-genome-deposited-us-database-earlier-than-previously-known
<<Verifying the quality of sequencing data submissions is necessary to maintain the integrity of such databases managed by NIH and ensures that users have access to trusted and reliable data.>>
<<Thus, the sequence was never made publicly available on GenBank.
In the interim, another submission to GenBank from a different submitter was received and published on January 12, 2020.
That submission published on January 12 provided the genetic sequence for SARS-CoV-2.
The sequence published on January 12, 2020, was nearly identical to the sequence that was submitted by Lili Ren.>>
And from the GenBank correspondence here:
https://d1dth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/Ford_H2_316_20240111_152518_05f9837537.pdf
Was a GI number given to this sequence?
The GenBank correspondence states:
<<AUTODELETED group 7385146
Groups deleted (use these grids to undelete if necessary):>>
Can a version of this submission from group 7385146 please be undeleted and made available for calculation of more exact comparison to the SARS-CoV-2 reference sequence; <<nearly identical>> is not very accurate.
Thank you.
Are any of the submissions from Lili Ren WH01 series available on this database archive perhaps?
https://web.archive.org/web/20200222054741/https:/bigd.big.ac.cn/ncov/genome/
Further, given that
<<Verifying the quality of sequencing data submissions is necessary to maintain the integrity of such databases managed by NIH and ensures that users have access to trusted and reliable data.>>
Can the GenBank indexers please provide some more information about BioProject: 1097963?
Now it is not public:
<<The following ID is not public in BioProject: 1097963
ID:1097963>>
https://web.archive.org/web/20240705052322/https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bioproject/?term=cybersecurity
But previously it was public…and available when searching for cybersecurity resources of GenBank:
https://web.archive.org/web/20240807055019/https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/bioproject/?term=Cybersecurity
This BioProject included a link to an IT education company…has this training been now completed by the GenBank indexers?
https://maetechacademy.edu.my/course.html
Given the stringent quality control NIH conducts how is it that this helpful BioProject is no longer available to the public?
Was it perhaps Spam or some other failure of the NIH’s high standards of data integrity and or cybersecurity?
Can the NLM GenBank resources please provide more stream lined support services and resources for reporting suspect submission that have made it past the NIH strict data integrity processes?
Data contamination is an important issue to avoid in GenBank submissions.
But JAMOGK000000000.1 Pseudomonas aeruginosa was removed by GenBank even when this contamination was found in related submission with AI/ML tools:
<<This record was removed because the sequence was determined to be contaminated. Please contact info@ncbi.nlm.nih.gov for further details>>
But in GenBank’s stringent data integrity rules there has been no attempt to identify the actual contaminant here in the JAMOGK01 series of data?
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Traces/wgs/JAMOGK01?display=contigs
In previous contaminated submission it was obvious where the PLA had contaminated the records with data relevant to COVID Origin;
For example NY5541 urine sample from 2019
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Traces/wgs/JAMOHC01?display=contigs&page=1&state=dead
And… NY5537 collected 2019 sputum sample submitted by Zhou,D:
Submitted (19-MAY-2022) State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and
Biosecurity, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology,
No. 20, Dongdajie, Fengtai, Beijing, Beijing 100071, China
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore/JAMOGK010000088.1?report=GenBank
See <<Breaking: SARS-CoV-2 Spike found in bacteria samples taken from China, 2019
January 20, 2023 >> Adeno News article
https://web.archive.org/web/20230122173319/https://adeno-news.com/2023/01/20/breaking-sars-cov-2-spike-found-in-bacteria-samples-taken-from-china-2019/
So too with JAMOGK01 can you please identify the contaminant and make this contamination public BEFORE you comply with request from PLA to remove data…
If you can flag the contaminant codes now, when you are aware of what they are, this would be helpful.
Thank you.
Finally;
I am interested in COVID origin research.
Prof Zhegli Shi of WIV was quite clear that I examine all available data on GenBank before asking for access to WIV’s virus databases.
See previous correspondence on this issue:
<<Case CAS-1324284-Y8N8F1 - National Library of Medicine Customer Service confirmation TRACKING:000435001291518>>
This is quite challenging as some of the data in GenBank are hidden from view.
I would like to be able to see that data, and I would like to know how it became suppressed.
For example: the pre-print <<Spread and Geographic Structure of SARS-related Coronaviruses in Bats and the Origin of Human SARS Coronavirus; Yu2018unpublished>>
and the data set and correspondence with GenBank from the submitting authors is important to ongoing COVID Origin research.
Now the title of the pre-print gives zero results…due to suppression.
No items found.
On August 09, 2022 this paper gave 163 search results in GenBank as seen in this archive.
https:/web.archive.org/web/20220809085043/https:/www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore/?term=Spread+and+Geographic+Structure+of+SARS-related+Coronaviruses+in+++++++++++++Bats+and+the+Origin+of+Human+SARS+Coronavirus
By basic bioinformatics analysis we can see the recoverable series of nucleotide & protein submissions by the authors
<<Yu,P., Hu,B., Li,B., Luo,D., Zhu,G., Zhang,L., Holmes,E.C., Shi,Z. and Cui,J.>> extends from the suppressed record:-
<<GI 1769824624>>Record suppressed: spike protein [Bat SARS-like coronavirus] - Protein - NCBInlm.nih.gov
And
<<GI 1769824623>>Record suppressed: Bat SARS-like coronavirus strain Rs161465_Guangdong spike protein (S) - Nucleotide - NCBInlm.nih.gov
To:-
<<GI 1769824592>> where it is interrupted by an unrelated sequence placed on 25-OCT-2018 that is not suppressed:
Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica serovar Infantis strain FSIS170230 - Nucleotide - NCBInlm.nih.gov
Then to <<GI 1769824316>>Record suppressed: Bat SARS-like coronavirus strain Rs5725_Yunnan ORF8 gene, complete cds
Followed again by the unrelated<<GI 1769824315>>
Also placed on 25-OCT-2019Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica serovar Infantis strain FSIS170230
This series of 308 suppressed GI GenBank submissions is extensive but also not the full set of 163 nucleotide results yet as this should result in 326 missing GI numbers and only 308 have been recovered so 18 GI submissions are still missing according to my calculations.
This means of the at least 163 nucleotide and protein sequence pairs submitted for this preprint and placed in GenBank, only 154 are able to be recovered for analysis by examining the series of GI numbers at this stage.
How many original GI data points were placed for this preprint?
Also, where are the final nine nucleotide and protein sequences pairs that were searchable on August 09, 2022?
That means at least eighteen GI numbers are missing and due to GenBank suppression are not able to be found?
Perhaps there is another way to recover these missing files?
Was there an earlier GI number series that was placed when the preprint was originally submitted?
When was this series linked to <<Yu2018unpublished>> originally submitted?
Given that cybersecurity concerns were highlighted by Prof ZLShi as reason for limiting access to WIV’s extensive bat virus databases, can you please reassure me that the missing data from <<Yu2018unpublished>> is safe, and send links to the remaining suppressed and missing sequence submissions.
Thank you for your assistance.
Kind regards
Mr Tommy Cleary
Postgrad Student UNDA.
3/-
Part of the solution is here in the Synthetic Markers of tail codes Cyphers in Baric Lab products…
https://northernvirginiamag.com/culture/culture-features/2022/10/14/cia-kryptos-sculpture-cipher/
The main error of Virology and associated Science is not being direct enough to finish the Math and calculate not only risk of LAI in an age of Synthetics…but also to extrapolate this to determine the Extinction level risk of LAI.
Link